

# Adapting the Model Driven Security strategy to generate contextual security policy for multi-cloud systems





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# Plan

-  **Context**
-  **State of the art**
-  **Model-Driven Security approach**
-  **Conclusion and further works**

# Context


- Globalized economic environment involve for companies to :
  - focus on their core business
  - develop new collaborative strategies
  - build their IS (Information System) around on the Business Process (BP).
- SOA(Service Oriented Architecture) provides companies a new model [1]:
  - Build activities functionalities as business services and combine them dynamically with the partner companies service.
  - Interoperable, and agile services;
  - Open system mean security threats
- Collaborative IS involve to share data, service and BP(Business Process) coming from different companies.
  - companies assets, which required to be protected
  - each has its own security policies

# Context


- To protect IS : EBIOS, MEHARI, OCTAVE approach [8]
  - Approach based on the vulnerabilities and threats analysis,
  - use knowledge bases
  - ➔ Not adapted to the dynamic environment imposed by process and SOA
  - ➔ Difficult and so long to implement
  - ➔ Not end users oriented (security expert is required)
- Cloud computing [3] emerge thank to :
  - Web 2.0
  - Development of broadband and network,
  - Virtualization
  - ➔ New solution to consume services and deploy collaborative IS (BP)
  - ➔ Allow to have on demand “unlimited” capacity for storage and processing
  - ➔ Involve a externalization strategy and new challenges to secure the S

# Context


## Challenge




Company A BP with security requirements



Company B BP with security requirements



Collaborate together



Secure BP take account each company security requirements and platforms specifications


## Our approach based on a Model-Driven Engineering (MDE).

- identify BP security requirements of each company,
- define an adapted Quality of Protection,
- generate adapted security policies, paying attention on the deployment platforms.

# State of the art

## Business process modeling

- Various types of modeling tools and languages : EPC, BPEL, WS-CDL, XPD, BPMN, ...
- BPMN is mostly used to describe flows between the different activities as well as “launching” conditions of a particular part of the process.



# State of the art


## Secure BP

Framework Evaluate criteria	OpenPMF [7]	SECTET [6]	BP Sec [4]	KIT Serure BP[5]
Abstractions levels	PIM-PSM-code	PIM-PSM-Code	CIM-UML Use case (PIM)	PIM-PSM
Approach used	UML	Annotation based+ UML	UML	Annotation
Oriented end user	No	No	Yes	No
Automatic Policy generation	Yes	Yes		Yes
Modification language and transformation	UML+DSL	UML2+SECTET-DSL	UML +QVT	Ad-hoc
Take account infrastructure	No	No	No	No
Take account execution context	No	No	No	Yes
Security criteria	Authentication, Authorization, Monitoring	Encryption, Intégrité, Non-repudiation, Authentication	Non-Repudiation, intrusion Détection, control, Authorization	Privacy, Access Authorization
Policy monitoring	Yes	No	Yes	No
SecaaS (security as a Service)	No	Yes	No	No
Security Standard	XACML	SAML, WS-policy, XACML		XACML

# State of the art

## Cloud security

- **Cloud Cube Model: Selecting Cloud Formations for Secure Collaboration, Jericho Forum, Version 1.0, (April 2009) [2]**
  - Define cloud security cube model that allows companies to choose the type of cloud that is adapted to their business needs






# State of the art


## conclusion

Business and application level




-Do not pay more attention on vulnerabilities of infrastructure  
-Not end user oriented.


Infrastructure level



-Customers don't trust providers  
-Difficult for providers to enforce each company policies.




# Model-Driven Security approach




# Model-Driven Security approach

## *Multidimensional model to secure BP*




# Multidimensional model

## ☰ Weaving BP/Security : Business Security context Model



# Multidimensional model


## Weaving Deployment/Security : Platform Security context Model



Platform context model


# Model-Driven Security approach

## MDS Approach



# Model-Driven Security approach

## CIM specification



$R = (N, T, L, \{R\})$

- N: Resource Name

- T: Resource Type

- L: Resource Layer

-U: the Resource URI (reference)

- R: Related Resources

```
R1(A1 "Activity" "Business", " http://com.insa.bp/connecteur/A1",{S11})
R11("S1" "Service" "Business", " http://com.insa.bp/connecteur/A1",{D11,S12})
R3(A3 "Activity" "Business", " http://com.insa.bp/connecteur/A3",{S31})
R8("A8" "Activity" "Business", " http://com.insa.bp/connecteur/A8",{S81})
R81(S81 "Service" "Service", " http://com.insa.bp/connecteur/A8/S81",{ D811, D812})
R82(S82 "Service" "Service", " http://com.insa.bp/connecteur/A8/S82",{ D821, D822})
R811(D811 "Data" "Service", " http://com.insa.bp/connecteur/A8/S81/D811",{ })
R812("D821", "Data", " Service ", "http://com.insa.bp/connecteur/A8/S81/D821",{ })
....
```

All the resources as :

**Res={R<sub>i</sub>} where 0 < i < N<sub>k</sub>; (1)**


Where “i” is the resource number and N<sub>i</sub> the total of the all resources.

**Res(R<sub>k</sub>)={ r / r ∈ Res ∧ r.N=R<sub>k</sub>} (2)**

Where R<sub>k</sub> .is the resource Name

# Model-Driven Security approach

## CIM specification



```



<resource id="8" name="A8" type="Activity" layer="Business"
  ref="http://com.insa.bp/connecteur/A8 "
  <functionalSpec>
    <strategic strategic="true" sensibility="TopSecret" />
  </functionalSpec>
  <organizationalSpec>
    <who accessMode="[role]" shared="true" users="[A.ChefProjet]" />
    <how devices="[PC]" networks="[Public, private]" />
    <when temporalCriteria="true" />
    <fromWhere localizationType="[IPDomaine]" />
  </organizationalSpec>
</resource>
  
```

N°	Questions	answers
<b>Functional specifications</b>		
1	Which services or activity manipulate personal data?	Any services and process
2	Which services or process manipulate financial data?	Any services and process
3	are there some activities in the process that handled data Strategic order (ie giving a strategic advantage to your business or associated with knowledge / expertise giving you a strategic advantage)?	yes
4	If yes, what level of sensitivity do you give to each activity which handle strategic data? Top secret? Secret? Access limited? public?	Limited [A9, A10, A15] Secret [A1, A3, A13, A14] Top secret[A8, A12]
<b>Organizational specifications</b>		
5	Are there activities that involve external stakeholders (partners, customers, ...)?	[A9, A10, A13]
7	Are there activities for which you wish to restrict access to specific time slots (eg access between 7 and 19h on working days)	Yes, ALL
8	For each activity subject to a restriction of access, how do you set the permissions: - Individually, ie giving a list of authorized users - For user groups (depending on their role, ...)	A.Production[A1] A.Conception[A2-A3] A.ChefProjet[A4-A8] B.ChefProjet[A9-A12] B.Production[A13] B.Conception[A14, A15]
9	Which means can you use to access to the resources (data or applications): - A public network (public Wifi, 3G network, home network of personal ...) - the company network (LAN, VPN) -Any Network	Any network



# Model-Driven Security approach

## ☰ CIM To PIM : define security requirement



$Req_i = (RR, (RT, RM), RG, \{RCtx\})$

- RR (Requirement Resource)
- RT (Requirement Type)
- RM (Requirement Metrics)= [0-1]
- RG (Requirement Goal)
- RCtx (Requirement context)

```
<securityreq:Requirement resource="AB" type="Authentication" metric="1">
  <context type="How">
    <condition key="Device" value="[PC]"/>
    <condition key="Network" value="[Public, private]"/>
  </context>
  <context type="Where">
    <condition key="Location" value="[IPDomaine]"/>
  </context>
</securityreq:Requirement>
```

All the requirements for all the resources as:

**Reqs={Req<sub>i</sub>} where 0<i<N<sub>i</sub>; (3)**

Where "i" is the requirement number and N the total of the all requirements of all resources.

The requirements associated to the resource R<sub>k</sub> is :

**Reqs(R<sub>k</sub>)= { {r} / r ∈ Reqs ∧ r.PR=R<sub>k</sub> } (4)**

# Model-Driven Security approach

## CIM To PIM : define security requirement

$$M_{CIM \rightarrow PIM} : \begin{array}{ccc} RES & \longrightarrow & REQS \\ (Res_1, Res_2, \dots, Res_n) & \longrightarrow & \mathcal{M}_{CIM \rightarrow PIM}(Res_1, Res_2, \dots, Res_n) \end{array} \quad (8)$$

Algorithme 2 : Extrait du fichier ATL de transformation CIM TO PIM

```
//Allow to know if resource need authorization système
helper context ResReq!Resource def: needAuthorization(): Boolean =
if(self.organizationalSpec.hasWho() or self.organizationalSpec.hasHow() or
self.organizationalSpec.hasWhen() or self.organizationalSpec.hasFromWhere()) then
true
else
false
endif;
rule Authorization {
from
s: ResReq!Resource
using { level:String=s.getMaxMetric().toString() ;//get the protection level
}
to
autho: SecReq!Requirement ()
do {
if(s.needAuthorization())
{
autho.resource <- s.name;
autho.type <- 'Authorization'; autho.metric <- level;
if(s.organizationalSpec.hasWho())
{
autho.context <- autho.context -> including( thisModule.WhoContext(s.organizationalSpec));
}
if(s.organizationalSpec.hasHow())
{
autho.context <- autho.context -> including( thisModule.HowContext(s.organizationalSpec));
}
if(s.organizationalSpec.hasWhen())
{
autho.context <- autho.context -> including( thisModule.WhenContext(s.organizationalSpec));
}
if(s.organizationalSpec.hasFromWhere())
{
autho.context <- autho.context -> including( thisModule.
hasFromWhere
(s.organizationalSpec));
}
}
}
```

```
<securityreq:Requirement resource="A8" type="Authorization" metric="1">
<context type="Who">
<condition key="AccessMode" value="[role]"/>
<condition key="Shared" value="true"/>
<condition key="users" value="[/Production]"/>
</context>
<context type="How">
<condition key="Device" value="[PC]"/>
<condition key="Network" value="[Public, private]"/>
</context>
<context type="When">
<condition key="Temporal" value="true"/>
</context>
<context type="Where">
<condition key="Location" value="[IPDomaine]"/>
</context>
</securityreq:Requirement>
```

# Model-Driven Security approach

## PIM To PSM : security pattern

Pat<sub>j</sub> = (PatN, PatG, PatTech, {PatR}, {PatM} {PatL}, {PatCtx}, {PatCol}, {PatParm})

-PatN : pattern's name;

-PatG : pattern's goal;

-PatType : Abstract or technical pattern

-{PatL} : pattern's layers;


-{PatCtx}: Pattern context (set of conditions and obligations)

-{PatR} : related patterns (sub-patterns);

-{PatM}: set of level of protection offer by the pattern



-{PatCol} : pattern collaboration;

-{PatParm} : setting elements;



# Model-Driven Security approach

## 



$$\left( \begin{array}{l} \forall r \in \text{RES} \wedge \text{polx} \in \text{Pols}(r) ; \text{Card}(\pi_{\text{polx.PT}} \text{Pols}(r))=1; \quad (9) \\ //\text{processus de dérivation} \\ \forall r \in \text{RES} \wedge \text{polx} \in \text{Pols}(r) \wedge (r.R \neq \emptyset \text{ avec } rk \in r.R) \exists \text{poly} \in \\ \text{Pols}(rk) / \text{polx.T} = \text{poly.PT} \wedge \text{poly.PM} \Rightarrow \text{poly.PM} \\ //\text{unicité du type de politique pour les ressources } r \text{ et } rk \\ \text{Card}(\pi_{\text{polx.PT}} \text{Pols}(r))=1 \wedge \text{Card}(\pi_{\text{poly.PT}} \text{Pols}(rk))=1 \end{array} \right)$$

**Polx= (PR, PT, PG, PL, PM, {PC}, PP)**

- PR : policy resource;
- PT : Policy type
- PG : Policy goal
- PL : the layer of this policy
- PM : the metric of this policy
- {PR} : the policy rules
- PP : the pattern to use

All the policy rules of all resources as:  
**Pols= {Polj} where 0<j<Nj;(6)**

The policies rules associated to the resource Rk is :  
**Pols(Rk) = {{p} / p ∈ Pols ∧ p.PR=Rk) ; (7)**

# Model-Driven Security approach

## PDM specification

Plat= (PlaN, PlaT, PlaTst,{PlatSM})

- PlaN : platform provider;

- PlaT : platform type (public, comminatory, private,..)

PlatTst: the level of client Trust to the platform

{PlatSM} : Security mechanisms implemented

```
<Platform id="1" provider="Consortium.com" cloudType="Communautory" trust="0.36">
  <generalSpec perimeter="Per-NS" manager="OUTSOURCED" technology="BOTH"
  localisation="EXTERNAL"/>
  <securitySpec compliance="[]" vivacity="true">
    <securityMechanism name="AccessControlSys" type="Authorization"
    val="false"ref=""/>
    <securityMechanism name="StorageSys" type="Availability" val="false" ref=""/>
    <securityMechanism name="BackUpSys" type="Availability" val="yes" ref=""/>
    <securityMechanism name="RedundantSys" type="Availability" val="false" ref=""/>
    <securityMechanism name="NetworkSecSys" type="Availability" val="yes"
    ref="http://vpn.concortuim.com"/>
  ...
  </securitySpec>
</platform>
```

### Questions

### Answers

#### Deployment platform specification

Who manages the Cloud infrastructure? You (the company) or the service provider?	The service provider
Where are data stored? Inside your company boundaries or outside.	Outside
Who owns the data? You (The company) or service provider?	The compagny
Is Cloud infrastructure shared to another's companies?	yes
Do infrastructure provides backup and versioning systems to restore the system in case of an incident?	No
Does Infrastructure provide services and protocols to secure communications (VPN, HTTPS, ...)?	Yes
Does Infrastructure provide security services and APIs to control access to business services and data?	No
Does infrastructure is certified (ISO 27001 certification, SAS 07, FISMA,)?	No

.....

# Model-Driven Security approach

## ☰ PSM To PSM : risk analysis and assessment

$$\text{Risque} = \text{NEP} \times \text{NPVP} \times \text{NI} = (\text{NEP} \times (1 - \text{trust} + e)) \times \text{NI} \quad (17)$$


$$R(A08) = (\text{NEP} = 0,75) * (\text{NPVP} = 1 - 0,36) * (\text{NI} = 1) = 0,48$$

Risque					
1	0.75	1	1		
0.75	0.5	0.75	1	1	
0.5	0.5	0.5	0.75	1	
0.25	0.25	0.5	0.75	0.75	
	0.25	0.5	0.75	1	Impact sur la ressource

*Protection level assessment grid*

# Model-Driven Security approach

## PSM To PSM : Security policy generation




```
<policy id="29" resource="S81" Type="Authentication" metric="1.0"
Layers="Service" pattern="Authentication">
  <policyRule condition="">
    <pattern name="Multi-factor" goal="Authentication System" type="Technique"
metric="1" layers="[Service, Data, Storage]">
      <setting key="Login/pwd/captcha" value="" />
      <setting key="OneTimePwd" value="" />
    </pattern>
    <context type="Device" value="[pc]"/>
    <context type="NetWork" value="[public]"/>
    <context type="Location" value="[ipdomain]"/>
  </policyRule>
  <policyRule condition="">
    <pattern name="Login/pwd/Captcha" goal="Authentication System"
type="Technique" metric="1" layers="[Service, Data, Storage]">
      <context type="Device" value="[pc]"/>
      <context type="NetWork" value="[private]"/>
      <context type="Location" value="[ipdomain]"/>
    </pattern>
  </policyRule>
</policy>
<policy id="30" resource="S81" Type="Authorization" metric="1.0" Layers="Service"
pattern="Authorization">
  <policyRule condition="">
    <pattern name="XACML" goal="Authorization System" type="Technique" metric="1"
layers="[business, Service, Data, Storage]">
      <setting key="policyFile" value="concertuim.com/policies/A/xacmlpolicies.xml" />
      <setting key="token" value="" />
    </pattern>
    <context type="AccessMode" value="[role]"/>
    <context type="Shared" value="true"/>
    <context type="Temporal" value="true"/>
    <context type="Device" value="[pc]"/>
    <context type="NetWork" value="[public, private]"/>
    <context type="Location" value="[ipdomain]"/>
  </policyRule>
</policy>
```

```
<binding name="CompanyAServicesSoap12" type="tns:CompanyAServicesSoap">
  <soap12:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"
style="document" />
  <wsp:policy id="29" type="Authentication"
ref="http://startup.consortuim.com/compagnieA/policies.xml" />
  <wsp:policy id="30" type="Authorization"
ref="http://startup.consortuim.com/compagnieA/policies.xml" />
  <wsp:policy id="32" type="Encryption"
ref="http://startup.consortuim.com/compagnieA/policies.xml" />
  <wsp:policy id="33" type="Integrity"
ref="http://startup.consortuim.com/compagnieA/policies.xml" />
  <operation name="S81">
    <soap12:operation soapAction="http://startup.consortuim.com/compagnieA/S81" >
      <input>
        <soap12:body use="encoded" encodingStyle="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-
encoding" />
      </input>
      <output>
        <soap12:body use="encoded" encodingStyle="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-
encoding" />
      </output>
    </operation>
  </binding>
```



# Model-Driven Security approach


## Model@Runtime : Security architecture






# Model-Driven Security approach

## *Model@Runtime : execution context*



# Model-Driven Security approach

## Security components implemented as SecaaS



# Conclusion

Framework Evaluate criteria	Ours solution (Secure BP)	OpenPMF [6]	SECTET [7]	BP Sec [4]	KIT secure BP[5]
Abstractions levels	CIM- PIM- PSM-code	PIM-PSM-code	PIM-PSM-Code	CIM-UML Use case (PIM)	PIM-PSM
Approach used	Annotation based + UML	UML	Annotation based+ UML	UML	Annotation
Oriented end user	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Automatic Policy generation	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Modelisation language and transformation	EMF+ATL+ Ad-hoc transformation	UML+DSL	UML2+SECTET-DSL	UML +QVT	Ad-hoc
Take account infrastructure	Yes	No	No	No	No
Take account execution context	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Security criteria	Authentication, Authorization, Integrity, Encryption, Non-Repudiation, Availability, Privacy	Authentication, Authorization, Monitoring	Encryption, Intégrité, Non-répudiation, Authentication	Non-Repudiation, Privacy, intrusion Détection, Access control, Authorization	Authorization
Policy monitoring	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
SecaaS (security as a Service)	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Security Standard	XACML, SAML, WS-Security	XACML	SAML, WS-policy, XACML		XACML

# Conclusion and further works

## Conclusion

- Use model driven approach to :
  - Identity, for each enterprise, their business process security requirements.
  - Define an adapted Quality of Protection
  - Generate contextual security policies
- Define security architecture to take account the execution context
- Define standardized security mechanisms as SecaaS which are invoked according to the runtime context and allow end to end security

## Further works

- Extend security pattern for privacy
- Monitoring security policies


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# Thank you for your attention

# Model-Driven Security approach

## Authentication sequence diagram



# Model-Driven Security approach

## Authorization sequence diagram

